Time: Tuesday, December 13th 10:00-11:30

Venue: Tencent Conference 261-349-198

Topic: Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism

Speaker Introduction: ZHANG Wanchang , PhD in Economics, University of California, San Diego. Research direction: mechanism design, information design, micro theory.

Organizer: Bay Area International Business School, Beijing Normal University

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The author constructs a novel random double auction as a robust bilateral trading mechanism for a profit-maximizing intermediary who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. It works as follows. The intermediary publicly commits to charging a fixed commission fee and randomly drawing a spread Then the buyer submits a bid price and the seller submits an ask price simultaneously. If the difference between the bid price and the ask price is greater than the realized spread, then the asset is transacted at the midpoint price, and each pays the intermediary half of the fixed Otherwise, no trade takes place, and no one pays or receives anything. strategy mechanism, always gives a positive worst-case expected profit, and maximizes the worst-case expected profit across all dominant-strategy mechanisms.