报告时间：12月13日周二上午 10：00-11：30

报告地点：腾讯会议261-349-198

报告主题：Random Double Auction: A Robust Bilateral Trading Mechanism

主讲人介绍：张万昌，加利福尼亚大学圣地亚哥分校经济学专业博士。研究方向：机制设计、信息设计、微观理论。

主办单位：北京师范大学湾区国际商学院

报告内容：The author constructs a novel random double auction as a robust bilateral trading mechanism for a profit-maximizing intermediary who facilitates trade between a buyer and a seller. It works as follows. The intermediary publicly commits to charging a fixed commission fee and randomly drawing a spread from a uniform distribution. Then the buyer submits a bid price and the seller submits an ask price simultaneously. If the difference between the bid price and the ask price is greater than the realized spread, then the asset is transacted at the midpoint price, and each pays the intermediary half of the fixed commission fee. Otherwise, no trade takes place, and no one pays or receives anything. This article shows that the random double auction is a dominant-strategy mechanism, always gives a positive worst-case expected profit, and maximizes the worst-case expected profit across all dominant-strategy mechanisms.

   作者为利润最大化的中介机构构造了一个新颖的稳健双边交易机制——随机双边拍卖。其工作原理是：中介公开承诺将收取一份固定佣金以及将从一个均匀分布中随机抽取一个点差，然后，买方申报买价，同时卖方申报卖价。如果买价和卖价之间的差价大于随机抽取的点差，那么资产以中间价成交，并且买卖双方各自支付中介一半的固定佣金。否则，没有交易发生，也没有人收款或者付款。作者证明随机双边拍卖是一种占优策略机制 (dominant-strategy mechanism), 永远确保正利润，并且是所有占优策略机制的最优机制。