报告时间：5月9日 周二 10：00-11：00

报告地点：腾讯会议：913-776-639、北京师范大学珠海校区励耘楼B312

会议链接：https://meeting.tencent.com/dm/SRAjyu2Wps5X

报告主题：促进创新还是操纵数量？Stimulating Innovation or Managing Numbers?

主讲人介绍：余俊彪，香港中文大学博士后研究员、香港理工大学金融学博士。研究方向：公司金融、企业创新、金融科技、ESG。

主办单位：北京师范大学湾区国际商学院

报告内容：2011年初颁布的“十二五”规划（2011-2015年）首次提出了每万人发明专利数量翻一番的目标，作者发现这一目标以及相关的政府干预对创新能力较弱省份的专利产出具有显著促进作用。双重差分模型结果表明，位于创新水平较低省份的上市公司专利申请增加了28.77%，然而这些专利的引用次数较少，以股价衡量的经济价值也较低。研究还发现，这些企业并未增加研发投入。此外，从专利补贴计划中收益更多的企业和受更多政府干预的企业，其专利数量增长更为明显。这表明，企业在政府的压力和激励下，增加了专利申请数量，但没有增加研发支出。因此，本文研究结果凸显了为促进科学技术而设定量化政策目标可能带来的意外后果。

China’s 12th Five-Year Plan, adopted in early 2011, set a target of doubling the number of invention patents per 10,000 people in the 2011-2015 period. We find that this target and related government interventions stimulate patent output in less innovative provinces from 2011 to 2015. A difference-in-differences analysis shows that firms in less innovative provinces file 28.77% more patent applications; however, these patents receive fewer citations and are less valuable in terms of stock market reactions. We also find that firms located in less innovative provinces do not increase their R&D expenditure. Moreover, firms that benefit more from patent subsidy programs and firms subject to more government interventions exhibit a greater increase in their number of patents, suggesting that firms increase their number of patent filings, but not their R&D expenditure, in response to government pressure and incentives. Our results thus highlight the unintended consequences of setting quantitative policy targets to promote science and technology.