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湾商商论系列Seminar第四十二期

题目:Learning by Consuming: Optimal Pricing for a Divisible Good

主讲人:刘斌

时间:2024年6月13日 14:30-16:00

地点:北京师范大学珠海校区励耘楼B312

摘要:

We study the revenue-maximizing mechanism when a buyer's value evolves because of learning-by-consuming. The buyer chooses the initial consumption based on his rough valuation. Consuming more induces a finer valuation estimate, after which he determines the final consumption. The seller faces the tradeoff that selling more initially makes selling the rest more profitable but on a smaller base. The optimum is a try-and-decide contract. In equilibrium, a higher first-stage valuation buyer chooses more initial consumption and enjoys a lower second-stage per-unit price. Methodologically, we address the difficulty that without the single-crossing condition, monotonicity plus envelope condition is insufficient for incentive compatibility. Our results help to understand contracts with learning features, e.g., course packages with included sessions and leasing agreements for experience goods.

我们研究当买家对商品价值的认知因消费习得信息而变化时的收入最大化机制。买家根据对商品价值的粗略估计选择其初始消费量。初始消费越多则获得的价值估计越精确。基于此新信息,买家再确定最终的消费量。卖家面临如下权衡:加大初始销售量可以提高剩余商品的单位销售利润,但剩余商品的量也随之减小。我们发现最佳的定价方式是“体验再决定”合同。在均衡时,第一阶段估值较高的买家会选择更高的初始消费量,并享受更低的第二阶段消费单价。在方法论上,我们克服了在没有单交叉条件时,单调性加包络条件不足以实现激励相容的困难。我们的结果有助于理解具有信息习得特点的合同,例如含有课程体验的课程包和体验商品的租赁协议。

主讲人简介:

刘斌,香港中文大学(深圳)经管学院副教授。中国科学技术大学理学学士,新加坡国立大学经济学博士。主要从事拍卖理论、竞赛理论、机制设计和产业组织理论的研究,成果见诸于American Economic Journal: Microeconomics、International Economic Review、Journal of Economic Theory、The RAND Journal of Economics等期刊。主持国家自然科学基金面上项目和青年科学基金项目(绩效评估获评“特优”)。