题目：Price Regulation and Product Offering in Healthcare

主讲人：贾丹

时间： 2024年4月11日（周四）14:30 – 15:30

地点：北京师范大学湾区国际商学院励耘楼B312

摘要：

Healthcare regulators possess the authority to set product prices, thereby influencing the strategic decision-making of service providers in terms of availability and quantity. The consequences of inadequate pricing can be substantial, leading to a reduced variety of products, a limited supply of treatments, and ultimately, restricted access to healthcare. This study examines the impact of Medicare payment policy on the product offerings of dialysis facilities, taking into account their capacity constraints, and assesses the subsequent effects on patient welfare. Our findings indicate that increasing payments for less expensive products leads to a rise in the total supply of treatments and a greater diversity of products, but this is only observed in facilities operating near their capacity limits. Additionally, these facilities are motivated to augment their capacity by opening new affiliated branches in nearby locations. Ultimately, our research shows that patients benefit from the increased availability of treatment options, with 16.5% of patients being able to retain employment post-initiation of dialysis without experiencing negative health consequences.

医疗监管机构有权制定产品价格，从而影响服务提供商在供应和数量方面的战略决策。定价不当可能会造成严重后果，导致产品种类减少、治疗供应受限，最终限制患者获得医疗服务的机会。本研究旨在考察医疗保险支付策略对透析机构产品供应的影响，并评估其对患者福利的作用。我们的研究结果表明，增加对价格较低产品的支付会提高治疗的总供应量和产品多样化，但只有在接近产能极限的透析机构中才能观察到这一点。此外，这些透析机构会通过在附近地区开设新的附属分支来应对价格改革。最终，这一改革使得患者透析后的就业率增加16.5%，且没有造成负面的健康影响。

个人简介

贾丹，北京师范大学湾区国际商学院助理教授，本科毕业于中国人民大学，获得法学学士学位。随后在香港大学获得经济学一等荣誉硕士学位(Distinction) 和经济学博士学位。主要研究方向是健康经济学和产业组织。