题目：Do Better Local Governments Make Cleaner Environment? Evidence from Fiscal Monitoring Policies

主讲人：余扬新

地点：北京师范大学珠海校区励耘楼B310

时间： 2026年5月6日 下午15:00-16:30

This study examines whether municipal governance shapes local industrial firms’ pollution levels. We argue that well-governed municipalities have strong environmental oversight and enforcement and, in turn, effective controls on corporate pollution. Using the staggered adoption of fiscal monitoring policies across U.S. states as a plausibly exogenous improvement in municipal governance, we find that toxic emissions from industrial facilities decline significantly following the implementation of such policies. This effect is more likely driven by investment in abatement measures than shrinkage in production activity. Our cross-sectional analyses show that the effect of fiscal monitoring policies on reducing toxic emissions is more pronounced for facilities located in areas with lower levels of ex-ante local government stewardship and those subject to weaker regulatory oversight from the Environmental Protection Agency. Overall, our findings underscore municipal governance and, more generally, local government quality as a significant factor disciplining local industrial firms’ environmental practices.

本研究探讨了市级政府治理是否影响地方工业企业的污染水平。我们指出，治理良好的市级政府拥有强有力的环境监管与执法能力，从而能有效控制企业污染。利用美国各州财政监督政策的分批实施作为市级政府治理水平提升的一个外生冲击，我们发现此类政策实施后，工业企业的有毒排放物显著减少。这种效应更可能源于污染治理投入的增加，而非生产规模的缩减。我们的横截面分析表明，财政监督政策对减少有毒排放物的效果，在那些事前地方政府监管水平较低的地区以及受美国环保局监管力度较弱的企业中更为显著。总体而言，我们的研究结果强调了市级政府治理——更广泛地说，地方政府治理质量——是约束地方工业企业环境行为的重要因素。