第二十期：

题目：Two Experimental Studies

1. Equal Sharing Can Motivate Lower-ability Workers with Guilt Aversion: A Real-Effort Experiment

2. Information, Perception of Fairness, and Preferences for Redistributions: A Survey Experiment on Urban Renewal in China

主讲人： Maoliang Ye （叶茂亮）

时间： 2023年11月16号12:00-13:30

地点：北京师范大学湾区国际商学院励耘楼B312

摘要：

This talk introduces two experimental studies: one laboratory real-effort experiment and one survey experiment.

1. Equal Sharing Can Motivate Lower-ability Workers with Guilt Aversion: A Real-Effort Experiment

Abstract：Despite a large literature on team incentives, studies on teams in a purely financial sense are limited. In such environments, team members independently engage in tasks with identifiable individual contributions, while their compensation is partially linked to team outputs. We conducted an experiment of such scenario with three distribution schemes (equal sharing, individual piece rate, and winner-takes-all) and examined these schemes both with and without a team threshold. Our results showed the surprising power of equal sharing on improving team productivity compared to winner-takes-all and individual piece-rate, contradicting the predictions of the standard economics theory. Our findings reveal that the higher team output observed under equal sharing was driven by the increased productivity of less able workers. This could be attributed to an explanation of guilt aversion. We also found that participants preferred piece rate over the other schemes. Yet, the presence of a team threshold heightened concerns about cooperation, leading to a greater preference for equal sharing. Our findings suggest that organizations with workers of varying abilities are likely to benefit from an appropriate equal sharing component tailored to their responsiveness to sharing in rewards.

摘要：尽管如今存在许多关于团队激励的文献，但关于纯粹报酬意义上的团队的相关研究仍然有限。在这种环境下，团队成员以独立的方式参与任务，并且个体贡献可以被明确识别，但他们的报酬部分取决于团队总产出。我们进行了一个实验模拟了这种情境，并考虑了三种分配机制（平均分配、个人计件工资和赢者通吃），而且研究了这些机制在有无团队产出门槛的情况下的效果。我们的研究结果与标准经济理论的预测相矛盾：平均分配相较于赢者通吃和个人计件工资对提高团队生产力具有惊人的作用。我们的研究发现，平均分配促进能力较低的员工的生产力提高，并且这可以归因于内疚厌恶。我们还发现，参与者更倾向于个人计件工资而不是其他方案。然而，团队门槛的存在提高了成员在合作方面的需求，导致更多人偏好平均分配。我们的研究表明，具有不同能力员工的组织在薪酬方案中引入一个适当的平均分配成分可能有助于提高组织生产力，该平均分配成分的权重取决于员工对报酬分享的回应性。

2. Information, Perception of Fairness, and Preferences for Redistribution: A Survey Experiment on Urban Renewal in China

Abstract：The literature on preferences for redistribution has highlighted the potential crucial role of perceived fairness behind income and wealth distributions. Another strand of literature has emphasized the influence of information and media on economic and political attitudes. This study links both strands of literature and examines the context of developing countries, whereas research on redistributive preferences is limited. During the period of post-reform rapid economic growth in China, the governments' focus on economic and decision efficiency may have raised concerns and debates about fairness. The vast urban renewal programs in China are one such example and have produced both winner and losers. This study employs a randomized survey experiment to causally examine how the information individuals receive regarding the losers and winners of urban renewal programs influences their perception of policy fairness and, consequently, their preferences for redistribution. Moreover, instrumenting perceptions of fairness with information intervention helps investigate the causal effect of perceptions of policy fairness on preferences for redistribution. Experimental results show that information treatments affect both participants’ perception of fairness and preferences for redistribution, and perception of fairness has an impact on certain measures of preferences for redistribution. Our results have implications for urban, development, and social policies, especially how to effectively contain inequality during economic growth as well as maintaining a fair, harmony, and inclusive society.

摘要：有关再分配偏好的文献强调了收入和财富分配背后的感知公平可能起到关键作用。另一方面的文献强调了信息和媒体对经济和政治态度的影响。本研究将这两方面的文献联系起来并重点关注再分配偏好研究中较少涉及的发展中国家情景。在中国改革开放后的经济高速增长过程中，政府对经济和决策效率的关注可能引发了关于公平的担忧和争议。在中国广泛实施的城市更新项目就是一个例子：它既带来了赢家，也带来了输家。本研究采用了随机调查实验的方法，因果性地研究了个体接收到的城市更新项目中关于赢家和输家的信息如何影响他们对政策公平的看法，从而影响了他们的再分配偏好。此外，我们利用信息干预作为公平感知的工具变量来识别公平感知对再分配偏好的因果影响。实验结果表明，信息处理影响参与者的公平感知和再分配偏好，而公平感知对再分配偏好的某些衡量指标产生影响。我们的研究结果对城市、发展和社会政策具有启示，尤其是考虑如何在经济增长过程中有效控制不平等，同时维护一个公平、和谐和包容的社会。

叶茂亮，现任南方科技大学商学院副教授（研究员正高职称）、博士生导师、深圳市“鹏城孔雀计划”特聘岗位。美国哈佛大学公共政策博士，曾任世界银行短期顾问，曾任教于中国人民大学及厦门大学经济学科。研究领域围绕行为经济学和应用微观经济学及其在企业管理和公共政策中的应用，覆盖行为与实验经济学、管理经济学（决策分析、组织人事）、公共政策与政治经济学、劳动与发展经济学。多篇论文发表于PNAS、Management Science、Governance、Journal of Comparative Economics等综合科学、管理学、经济学、公共政策及社会科学顶级和知名国际期刊。曾获福建省高层次引进人才B类，深圳市哲学社会科学优秀成果奖，担任经济学、公共政策、政治学、社会科学领域国内外知名期刊以及国家自然科学基金匿名评审人，主持国家自然科学基金面上项目（2项）、教育部、中央高校、广东省和深圳市等各级科研项目，担任全球劳动经济学组织Global Labor Organization Fellow和中国行为与实验经济学论坛及中国劳动经济学者论坛理事会成员。

Maoliang Ye joined the Business School of the Southern University of Science and Technology in 2020 as an associate professor. He got his Ph.D degree in Public Policy from Harvard University. He served as a short-term consultant at the World Bank Group, and previously taught at Renmin University of China and Xiamen University. His main research areas center around behavioral economics and applied microeconomics as well as their applications in business management and public policy, and cover behavioral and experimental economics, managerial economics, public policy and political economy, labor and development economics. His publications appear in PNAS, Management Science, Governance, Journal of Comparative Economics, and other top and well-known international journals in general science, management, economics, public policy, and social sciences. He serves as a Global Labor Organization Fellow, a member in councils of China Behavioral & Experimental Economics Forum as well as China Labor Economist Forum, has been a PI for two NSFC general grants and other major grants, serves as an ad hoc reviewer for NSFC grant applications and major journals in economics, public administration, political science, psychology, and social sciences.

第二十一期：

题目：Using unvoiced account as a response to exploitation

主讲人：王禹衡

时间：2023年11月17日 12：00-13：30

地点：北京师范大学湾区国际商学院励耘楼B312

摘要：Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to provide theoretical and empirical insights into the tactically mobilisation of both voiced and unvoiced counter accounts by oppressed social groups to response to mandatory overtime.

Design/methodology/approach – This paper presents a longitudinal case study of a Chinese listed white goods company which applies the 996-work regime and the oppressed employees’ tactic use of voiced and unvoiced counter accounts to response to hegemonic discourses and actions. In total, 36 interviews were conducted in 2019 by the author to explore how the interviewees were exploited by the company’s exploitive 996-work regime and how and why they selectively deployed the forms of voiced and unvoiced counter accounts to respond to the hegemonic discourses, exploitation and mandatory overtime. Drawing on the insights from Zerubavel’s (2006) social-psychological theory of silence, the unvoiced counter account is conceptualised and used to understand oppressed groups’ practices of silence.

Findings – The study found that the most servile employees tended to keep silence when they were illegally and unethically forced to work overtime from 9 am to 9 pm, six days a week (i.e., the 996-work regime) even if they clearly knew they were being negatively affected by the practices of “996” that reflected domination, exploitation, oppressions and mandatory overtime. Although few counter accounts were produced and voiced anonymously on internet, both the exploiters and most servile employees collectively criticised and expelled the counter accountors, restored the oppression and exploitation and subsequently remain silent to these problematic issues of social injustices and human rights abuses. These tactics were resulted from servile groups’ fear of revenge of exploiters, avoidance of embarrassment, and shame of being related to exploiters.

Originality/value – The concept of unvoiced counter account categorised the concept of counter account into voiced/unvoiced counter accounts. This concept showed the possibility of engagement in silence as a reaction to the hegemonic discourses and actions rather than merely producing and voicing counter accounts.

Keywords: Unvoiced counter account, mandatory overtime, silence, 996 work regime

Paper type: Research paper

本文的目的是为被压迫的社会群体对强制性加班的回应提供理论见解。本文介绍了一家白电企业的996工作制和受牵制员工的策略性使用会计手段以应对加班问题。采访和其他文本被搜集分析，并最终借助泽鲁巴维尔的社会心理学沉默理论，提炼出无声账户会计概念对数据进行分析。本文发现大部分员工面临加班的问题，但即使他们清楚地知道自己受压迫，仍对此保持集体性沉默，即产生无声账户，因为员工认为运用反会计账户会导致更严重后果。本文还发现当反账户会计制造者出现之后，造成了范围更大，更难被打破的沉默账户的出现。

个人简介：王禹衡为北京师范大学湾区国际商学院助理教授。他于2022年获得英国格拉斯哥大学亚当斯密商学院博士学位。他的主要研究领域为哲学会计，企业社会责任会计，管理会计，和会计职业,研究成果已发表于Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal等期刊，另有研究论文收到Accounting, Organizations and Society的返修邀请。