题目：Regulating Firm Disclosure via Minimum Quality Standards

主讲人：杨仁琨

时间：2023年4月20日（周四）12:00-13:30

地点：北京师范大学珠海校区励耘楼B312

摘要：

We consider a vertical oligopoly market in which (i) two firms have their products tested publicly before launch, and (ii) a minimum quality standard (MQS) is imposed. Firms choose the accuracy of their tests, balancing two competing incentives: withholding information makes it more likely to pass the MQS, while revealing information enlarges differentiation and softens price competition. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, each firm chooses a test that fully reveals high qualities and pools middle qualities around the MQS. For the regulator, an interior MQS intensifies price competition and thus benefits consumers. When firms can invest in stochastic quality enhancement prior to tests, they may or may not differentiate in effort choices, depending on the relative scope of differentiation through the information channel. An interior MQS provides incentives for the firms to improve quality, sometimes in a drastic way.

报名：https://www.wjx.cn/vm/ex5hAH6.aspx#

个人简介：

杨仁琨，暨南大学经济学院经济系助理教授，博士毕业于俄亥俄州立大学经济系。主要研究领域为微观经济理论，包括机制设计、信息设计与产业组织理论。